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Introduction 
The prime goal of this paper is to discuss the challenges I experience to operationalize 
mechanisms of representation and accountability in the context of local governance 
networks in Flanders (Belgium)1. Over the last two decades we witness a proliferation of 
local governance networks in Flanders that operate between governmental levels and 
beyond territorial borders. Local governments increasingly establish relationships with 
e.g. autonomous agencies, other governments, private organizations or with a 
combination of these (Agentschap voor Binnenlands Bestuur 2012). It is argued this 
new organizational layer on top of the local political landscape challenges traditional 
merits of local democracy like popular control, territorial sovereignty and the primacy of 
politics. From a traditional perspective on liberal representative democracy these 
governance practices are therefore frequently labeled as undemocratic. Yet according to 
a postliberal perspective governance networks might even expand the democratic 
quality of a decision making process as long as they are anchored to the bodies of local 
representative democracy (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). 
Local elected politicians are often seen as the lynchpin between both worlds. Obviously, 
the validity of this argument depends on the actual role local elected politicians adopt.  
In this regard my research project started with three fundamental questions. Firstly, 
what role do local politicians play in framing, designing and managing governance 
networks with regards to the municipality, this is in metagovernance? Secondly, what 
role do local politicians play in interest mediation and decision making in relationship to 
their municipality, this is in co-governance? Lastly, what role do local politicians play in 
the representation of the municipality in the network and in its subsequent 
accountability? 
This last question I want to explore further in this paper since I experience a tension 
between the operationalization of governance networks as composited sites of complex 
decision making on the one hand and the operationalization of representation and 
accountability on the other hand. While the theoretic literature retreats from the 
                                                        
1 This text is part of PhD-research project on the role of local elected politicians with regards to the 
democratic anchorage of governance networks conducted within the frame of the Policy Research Centre 
on Governmental organization in Flanders (SBOV III - 2012-2015), funded by the Flemish government. 
The research consists of a qualitative study of strategic and complex decision making within the realm of a 
local governance network in the region of Kortrijk.  
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principle-agent approach on representation and accountability its remnants are still 
present in our conceptualization of these mechanisms. I will start this paper with 
introducing the way I approach local governance networks and complex decision 
making before I elaborate on this operationalization challenge. 
Governance networks and complex decision making processes 
Governance and networks 
Since the last decades of the 20th century there has been much ado about the so-called 
rise of governance within political studies, public administration and related fields 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2005; Stoker and Chhotray 2009; Bevir 2011). The term 
governance is borrowed from a broad variety of approaches that all use governance to 
describe and explain changes in our world in general and changes in the nature and role 
of the state in particular. I follow the understanding of scholars who approach 
governance as a new academic paradigm  through which we can deal efficiently and 
effectively with the specific complexity, interdependency and dynamics of contemporary 
public policy issues (Kuhn 1962; Sullivan, Sørensen et al. 2011; Klijn and Koppenjan 
2012). 
I adopt the comprehension of Rhodes (2007) that governance equals “governing with 
and through networks”.  Hence the emergence of governance networks should not be 
understood as the end of state authority but rather as a redefinition of it (Hajer and 
Wagenaar 2003). I base my understanding of governance networks further on Sørensen 
and Torfing (2007) who define a governance network as:  
“a (more or less) stable articulation of mutually dependent, but operationally autonomous 
actors from state, market and civil society, who interact through conflict-ridden 
negotiations that take place within an institutionalized framework of rules, norms, shared 
knowledge and social imaginaries; facilitate self-regulated policy making in the shadow of 
hierarchy; and contribute to the production of ‘public value’ in a broad sense of problem 
definitions, visions, ideas, plans and concrete regulations that are deemed relevant to 
broad sections of the population.”  
Admittedly this definition is covering a wide array of phenomena. Therefore I emphasize 
three dimensions which are already implicitly present in this definition.  
First, governance networks are “being formed, reproduced, and changed by an ecology 
of games between these actors” (Klijn 1996). Hence governance networks do not equal 
fixed institutional settings but institutional settings that change over time. Decision 
making within a governance network is composed by many moments and all these 
moments can be seen as tipping points where the whole process could have proceeded 
in a different direction (Block, Steyvers et al. 2010).  
Second, the complexity of governance networks is defined by their composite character. 
Chains of explicit and implicit decisions get interwoven in a nexus of different 
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governments, various arenas of governance and informal channels (Kingdon 2003; 
Block and Paredis 2012). Governance networks consist of many (sub)systems, parallel 
circuits and tangled series of decisions (Teisman 2000; Teisman 2005; Block, Steyvers et 
al. 2010).  
Third, governance networks involve strategic and complex policy issues. The issues are 
complex because they go beyond the existing institutional boundaries of governments 
and involve many policy domains. This complexity is moreover reinforced by the 
diffusion of resources like knowledge, competences, legitimacy and means of production 
among different actors. The issues are strategic because they have the ambition to define 
the operational margins of public policy in space and time (Mintzberg 1978; Marcussen 
and Torfing 2007; Blanco, Lowndes et al. 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012; Torfing, 
Peters et al. 2012).  
Complex decision making processes 
For my understanding of the analysis of decision making processes in governance 
networks I am indebted to Teisman (2000), in particular to his conceptualization of the 
rounds model. A decision making process consist in this model on a series of rounds. A 
round is defined by a particular choice situation on an issue. Decisions both conclude 
rounds as initiate new rounds with new chances for all actors involved to influence the 
preliminary outcome. Moreover interdependent actors do not only make decisions 
jointly but also separately from each other. All these decisions mutually influence, elbow 
or build on each other. Seen through this lens a decision making process consists of a 
series of decisions in various arenas, hence suiting the aforementioned characteristic of 
governance networks.  
A governance network then is formed by a policy game surrounding a complex and 
strategic policy issue. The policy game itself takes place in and between governance 
arenas. A particular arena includes a set of specific actors that want to influence the 
policy issue at hand and is constituted by some organizational arrangements and a code 
of conduct. The complexity of such a process comes from many factors. First, we have 
the amount of players and their, often unpredictable, strategic choices. Second, we have 
the number of arenas that interact at different places in space and time. Lastly, policy 
games are not played in a vacuum so (parts of) other policy games might interfere with a 
specific policy game (Teisman 2000; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; van Gils and Klijn 2006). 
Moreover, as described in table 1, the structural context, political culture and institutional 
milieu surrounding a governance network will mediate the functioning of this network 
(Di Gaetano and Strom 2003).  
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Table 1 Conceptualization of governance networks 
 
Hence if we want to analyze the democratic anchorage of a governance network we need 
to take this layered complexity and dynamic into account. Therefore I argue we need to 
map the actors and arenas of such a network within a particular context before we can 
start to explore the political representation and accountability mechanisms of such a 
governance network. 
The local governance network configuration in Kortrijk 
Let me introduce you very briefly to the empirical background of my research. The 
region of Kortrijk consists of thirteen municipalities that collaborate on extra-municipal 
issues.  Some of this collaborative arrangements negotiate about strategic and complex 
issues in the region. These local governance network arenas position themselves 
between two institutional levels in Flanders: the municipal level and the provincial level. 
Hence they form an intermediary level of governance structures. The strategic and 
complex decision making in the region is mainly centered within the realm of the 
intermunicipal company for regional development (Leiedal), the Conference of Mayors 
and Regional Socioeconomic Consultation Committee (RESOC). 
Most of the members of these governance arenas are local elected politicians, other 
members are representing corporatist interests or other governmental levels. 
Interestingly these three bodies are interwoven by intermediary actors who are either 
official members of these boards or are invited to participate as advisory member. These 
overlapping mandates are the result of understanding between some entrepreneurial 
politicians and administrators, who seem “to act like the spiders of their webs” (De 
Rynck, Temmerman et al. 2013) since they manage in part to organize their own circuits 
of interest mediation, representation and accountability.  
Actors Directly or indirectly involved. They have resources and strategic 
preferences. 
Governance arenas Settings for decision making involving certain actors.   
Decision rounds Defined by a choice situation the actors are confronted with. 
Policy game The pushing and pulling of a strategic and complex policy issue. 
Institutional milieu The formal and informal institutional arrangements that mediate 
the interaction between actors in the governance arenas. The 
institutional milieu does not only consist of organizational rules 
but also of logics of conduct shaping key positions and relations. 
Political culture The normative assumptions on the appropriate role and goals of 
the government and its actors wherein a governance network is 
embedded.  
Structural context The macro societal parameters wherein a governance network is 
embedded like the economic structures, demographics, extra local 
regulation etc.  
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The political culture of this governance network is one of consensus decision making. On 
the one hand this culture is influenced by a long tradition of corporatist policy-making in 
Belgium and in the region in particular. On the other hand it has been facilitated by a 
long tradition of Christian-Democratic party homogeneity in the region (until recently) 
(Block, Steyvers et al. 2010). Within this governance network setting the case study 
reconstructs three strategic and complex policy dossiers: the adoption of a regional 
windmill implementation strategy, the realization of an intermunicipal crematory and 
the creation of an economic-artistic urban development project in the city of Kortrijk. 
Through the reconstruction of these dossiers I want to explore how local political actors 
understand and play their role with regards to democratic anchorage.  
The democratic anchorage of governance networks 
Of course defining democracy is not an easy and uncontested task. However one can 
delimit the field of research to approaches formulated within the liberal tradition on 
democracy (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Perspectives within this tradition share an 
interest in the balancing act between individual liberty and political equality within the 
realms of a territorially defined political community. Traditionally this perspective is 
highly skeptic about governance networks. Firstly, it is argued governance networks 
might undermine political equality through the bypassing of elected representatives.  
Secondly, they are considered a threat to individual liberty through the blurring 
boundary between state and society and between public and private. Lastly, they are 
regarded as undermining the territorial basis of a political community.   
Nowadays, the democratic repertoire has been widened with so-called postliberal 
conceptions and governance networks are no longer straightforwardly labelled as 
undemocratic. Governance networks, seen from this perspective, allow to open up 
decision making circles to affected actors on a case-by-case basis. Moreover it is argued 
that governance networks potentially enhance political mobilization whereby more 
actors participate, discuss and deliberate policy issues. This way governance networks 
might respond to the fragmentation of society with tailor-made decision making. From 
this point of view the blurring of the traditional borderlines is not necessary seen as a 
threat but as a prerequisite to increase the democratic potential of such governance 
settings. Yet, also within this postliberal stance it is argued that the contribution of 
governance networks to democratic deliberation still depends upon their democratic 
anchorage and in particular upon the extent to which certain mechanism allow the 
reconciliation of governance networks with representative government (Sørensen and 
Torfing 2005; Barnett 2011; Torfing, Peters et al. 2012).   
Local elected politicians are often at the crossroads of the latter fairways and given their 
unique position in the democratic polity they may be considered as key for subsequent 
anchorage. How local elected politicians provide linkage is key to whether governance 
as the fragmentation of governing power should be considered as undermining the 
influence of elected authorities on the political process or should be regarded as a 
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reorientation and readjustment of their capacity to govern in an increasingly complex 
environment (Hansen 2001; Aars and Fimreite 2005). Therefore ‘making’ the 
municipality ‘present’ and acting on its behalf is one of the crucial substantive aspects of 
the municipal representative in governance networks  (Dovi 2014). 
This brings this paper back to the question of the operationalization of representation 
and accountability. 
Representation within governance networks 
As Pitkin (2004) pointed out however we cannot simply assume the relationship 
between representation and democracy. The presence of a mandated politician in a 
governance network is not sufficient to call that governance network democratic. 
Therefore we need some active attachment of a governance network to the local 
democracies. Yet in political science there has been a long tradition of describing 
representation in terms of “standing for” rather than “acting for” (Rao 1998; Andeweg 
and Thomassen 2005).  Formalistic accounts take the representation of interests as self-
evident and merely analyse whether a representative legitimately holds his position (a 
question of formal authorization) and if a representative can be sanctioned or has been 
responsive (a question of accountability). Descriptive accounts assess the accuracy of 
resemblance between the representative and the represented. The focus is then on who 
representatives are and not on what they do (Mansbridge 2011). Both accounts of 
representation approach representation as static. The preferences of the represented 
are regarded as given and the relation between represented and representative is seen 
as unidirectional from the former to the latter.  
More contemporary research frames representation as a dynamic process involving 
interactive relationships. With regards to the operationalization of representation I 
based my understanding for instance on Andeweg and Thomassen (2005). They propose 
a new typology of representation. Representation is according to them guided by a sense 
of direction and by a sense of timing. In representation from below representatives are 
expected to translate the views of the represented into policy. According to 
representation from above representatives instigate the presentation of policy towards 
the represented. When representation is performed ex ante, control precedes the 
representative act while when representation happens ex post, control follows upon it.  
Mansbridge (2003) makes a similar distinction between anticipatory and promissory 
modes of representation. While the latter mode is based on the selection of 
representatives the former mode conceives the possibility of sanction as constituting 
representation. According to Andeweg and Thomassen’s ideal-typical model of 
representation, the subsequent modes of representation are  authorization (from above 
and ex ante), delegation (from below and ex ante), accountability (from above and ex 
post) and responsiveness (from below and ex post) (Andeweg 2003; Andeweg and 
Thomassen 2005). 
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The remnants of the principal-agent approach 
This typology of representation offers an interesting response to the common critique 
on the unidirectional focus of the standard principal-agent approach.  Adding the sense 
of direction is interesting because it breaks with the traditional understanding of the 
nature of representation as being essentially bottom-up. Representation is then seen as 
a constantly varying repertoire covering both directions. Yet while the typology as a 
whole encompasses reciprocity each mode of representation remains unidirectional. 
Besides what counts for the sense of direction holds true for the operationalization in 
terms of timing, since here we also witness a one way approach. Moreover one can 
wonder if it makes sense to conceptualize an act of representation as solely backward 
oriented, a question I will return to further in this paper. 
The remnants of the mandate-independence controversy 
Another reflection I have on the typology is related to two particular modes of 
representation as described by it: authorization and responsiveness. The former regards 
the representative as someone with the authorization, given by the represented, to 
implement his manifesto. The latter views the representative as someone with the 
constant desire to please (or with fear for) the represented. In a way these modes mirror 
the trustee-delegate dichotomy as presented by the mandate-independence controversy. 
In this understanding the trustee type of representatives are endowed with the 
autonomous judgment to act in the interests of their constituency and the delegate type 
of representatives are restricted in their behavior by the clear instructions or mandate 
they got from their constituency (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005; Mansbridge 2011; 
Willems and Van Dooren 2012).  Remarkably, when we take this conceptualization at its 
extreme, representatives are not any longer representing but merely judging 
autonomously in the trustee case or executing political affairs in unmediated ways in the 
delegate case. Does this understanding of representation not reflect formal, static, one-
dimensional notions of representation that are at odds with representation as a dynamic 
process defined by interactive social relationships (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005; 
Urbinati and Warren 2008; Hendriks 2009; Mansbridge 2011)? Therefore one can 
wonder if it is more fruitful to regard representation simply in terms of delegation (from 
below and ex ante) and accountability (from above ex post). 
Representation as delegation 
However as pointed out before two fundamental characteristics of  governance 
networks may challenge the representative relationship conceived as delegation. First, 
in a network context interests and preferences are usually not straightforward, 
predetermined and static but subject to a permanent process of construction (by 
representatives) and identification (by the represented). Second, networks thrive on 
negotiated decision making calling for an open mandate to respond to new challenges 
and opportunities that may alter interests and preferences through power-ridden forms 
of deliberation. In networks, representation is thus much more of a performative act to 
which the selection and instruction of representatives, the ability to develop an 
informed opinion on and to critically asses and differ on the representative performance 
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are crucial. Representatives tend to act with more discretion but in a reflexive manner, 
i.e. to the extent that they will try to anticipate and pre-empt on the possibility of ex-post 
critique. This comes closer to accountability (from above and ex post) as the primary 
mechanism of representation (Sørensen and Torfing 2003; Sørensen and Torfing 2005).  
Representation as accountability 
Yet to operationalize representation as accountability seems to be at odds with the very 
notion of representation as simply to “make present again” (Pitkin 2004; Dovi 2014). 
Accountability seems rather to be the prior condition to guarantee democratic 
representation than to be a representative act in itself. It seems the typology confuses a 
mechanism of control with a mechanism of voice. I wonder if it might be more helpful to 
operationalize both mechanisms separately since democratic anchorage is a matter of 
the well-functioning of both these mechanisms.  
Representation as a mechanism of voice 
Some scholars have been promoting the operationalization of representation as a matter 
of voice. For instance, Saward (2005) argues that representation is not a fact but rather 
a process that involves the making of representative claims by representatives. The 
represented people are but invested with meaning through the very process of 
representation. Represented interests are simply portrayals according to Saward 
(2005). “To speak for others is to construct portraits of the represented that bring 
selected character traits and the interests of the latter into some focus”. Interestingly 
with regards to governance practices is Saward’s claim that his view on representation 
does not have to be conceptualized through an electoral link. While electoral selection 
and sanction remains possible some representatives, like stakeholders, social workers, 
human rights advocates, etc.  might claim their legitimacy from other sources than 
election. This alternative constituencies might be short-lived, non-territorial and 
spontaneously-formed. Yet they might be claimed by representatives in a political 
process. With regards to the elected politicians I study one can for instance wonder if 
they simply represent the municipality or rather represent the region, some political 
party or some other constituency.  
Urbinati (2000) conceptualizes representation as acts of advocacy. She argues “an 
‘advocate’ is not asked to be impartial like a judge, or to reason in solitude like a 
philosopher”. Advocates have ties to the cause they represent but are not just defined by 
it. “Their job is not to apply the rule but to define how the facts fit or contradict the rule 
or to decide whether the existing rule conforms to principles that society shares or a 
‘good’ government should adopt” (Urbinati 2000).  For example a mandated politician 
might not try to present himself as a copy of the average citizen or councillor of his 
municipality but rather appeal to his skills as a defendant of the municipal ideals to 
convince his audience he is a respectable representative. 
Disch (2011) emphasizes that representation is constitutive. The process of 
representation mobilizes a people to become a political agent. In her view interests and 
preferences are deliberatively formed. Also the represented can change their opinion 
9 
 
over time and she argues because sanction is retrospective representation becomes 
anticipatory. Hence representation is interactive and more continually reflexive than 
traditionally conceptualized. Besides a representative relationship is not performed in a 
void because different representatives and opinion makers are in competition with one 
another. So it is imaginable that a political representative changes his opinion and 
subsequent representative claims over time due to new circumstances or information.  
All three scholars emphasize that representation is not the unmediated reflection of 
demands and interests. Representation is future oriented and a creative process. It is 
political and idealizing. It does not reproduce a state of affairs but produces effects. 
Hence the process of representation plays its own part in forming political groups and 
identities as well as in shaping societal interests and demands. This way representation 
as voice testifies with democratic deliberation but one can wonder how it relates to 
democratic anchorage.  
Representation and democratic anchorage 
The democratic anchorage model, from a postliberal perspective, balances the presence 
of representative claims from non-elective actors with a system claim that there is some 
formal line between the governance network and representative government. This line 
can be explicit through democratic delegation of political representatives and/or 
implicit through practices of metagovernance and monitoring by the local liberal 
representative governments. Saward (2005) argues that many network approaches 
make yet another claim. They stress that actors are “locked into” networks. Because 
actors are embedded in a network of mutually dependent relationships they are limited 
in how and about what they can govern. Disch (2011) argues when representative 
claims are enclosed by a system of interlocking reflexive institutions they might not be a 
threat to democratic legitimacy. This way “a ruling by one triggers a review by another”. 
Hence mechanisms of voice require mechanism of control in order to claim democratic 
legitimacy. Therefore some form of accountability should be exercised in order to 
anchor governance networks to democracy (Papadopoulos 2007). Yet they see the link 
between both mechanisms as a dynamic movement. Maybe we can consider these 
mechanisms as two sides of the same coin that constantly flips during the process of 
decision making. Therefore I proceed this paper with a discussion on accountability.  
 
Accountability in relation to governance networks 
Accountability is one of those conceptual umbrellas that have the tendency to become a 
loaded buzzword, therefore I specify my understanding in line with Bovens (2007) as a 
social mechanism of relations. Based on his definition accountability can be considered 
as a relationship between an actor and a forum involving an obligation to explain and 
justify conduct (Bovens 2010). This relationship implies the need of the actor to provide 
information about his performance to the forum, the possibility of debate between actor 
and forum and the ability for the forum to pass judgement on the actor through 
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sanctions or rewards (Bovens 2007; Bovens, Schillemans et al. 2008). This definition 
helps to make a clear distinction with other concepts such as responsiveness or the 
mere communication of information since these concepts lack an element of judgement 
and/or deliberation (Bovens 2010).  
The remnants of the principal-agent approach again 
One can find similar discussions on the remnants of the principal-agent model in public 
administration theory on accountability as on representation in the political science 
literature. The model is criticized on the basis of four problem statements: its one-
dimensional approach, its unidirectional focus, its hierarchical notion and its context 
independency.   
The first problem statement argues against the notion that a single chain of delegation 
between principals and agents is mirrored by a corresponding single chain of 
accountability (Strøm 2000). However networks consist of many parallel and 
crisscrossing chains of control.  Multiple interdependent actors are present in various 
governance arenas that negotiate and share decision making. Many of them have to 
explain or justify conduct to more than one account-holder (Mulgan 2003; Willems and 
Van Dooren 2012). This tendency has been accompanied by an evolution in 
accountability theory from the notion of  "one person, one vote, one representative" to 
the notion of "one person, many interests, many voices, multiple votes, multiple 
representatives" (Willems 2009). Hence the concept of accountability itself becomes 
approached as a network of accountability relations. Examples are the notions of “360 
degrees accountability”, “extended accountability” and “aggregate accountability” among 
others (Mulgan 2003; Willems 2009). I think the understanding of accountability by 
Bovens can withstand this first problem statement since actors can be giving accounts to 
various forums. The nature of each forum can be political, legal, administrative, 
professional or social. Moreover both forums and actors can be individuals, public 
officials, organizations, boards or administrations etc. The basis for accountability 
regarding the actor can be corporate (an organization standing as one actor), 
hierarchical (one actor standing for all actors), collective (all actors standing as one) or 
individual (each actor standing for himself) (Bovens 2007). 
A second critique on the principal-agent approach is directed to its one way 
conceptualization of relations. On the one hand power is solely regarded as in the hands 
of forums that have the ability to sanction actors. On the other hand the practice of 
accountability is in the hands of actors. However from a network perspective actors and 
forums are seen as interdependent in both ways. Actors have the power to construct 
representative claims while forums have the possibility to not only contest but also 
reframe the type of narrative that has been given.  Hence accountability is dialectical in 
nature. To render an account is “to construct and present a narrative of past events and 
actions” (Black 2008). Yet the actor will follow some narrative logic that make sense to 
himself as well as to his audience.  Moreover the story an actor decides to tell, or which 
it may be required to tell,  might alter the behaviour of both the actor as well as the 
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forum to bring itself more into accord with the accountability narrative been told. Just as 
with representative claims, accountability claims might have a transformative effect and 
potentially build a new understanding about the objectives, means and ends of a 
decision making process (Black 2008). In line with this critique the actor-forum 
conceptualization regards accountability not simply as information giving by actors and 
rectification by forums. Also the presence of critical debate and policy dialogue is 
regarded as a crucial aspect of accountability (Bovens 2007; Bovens, Schillemans et al. 
2008). The nature of the conduct can be about the general performance, particular 
decisions or compounded. The latter means giving an account about holding someone 
else to account (Mulgan 2003). 
A third objection is directed on the hierarchical nature of relations in the principal – 
agent framework. In governance networks political actors are accountable to a number 
of forums which are not necessarily their democratic principal (Papadopoulos 2007). 
Moreover some actors in governance networks might be self-authorized and not elected 
representatives. Therefore accountability tends to become horizontal, i.e. towards other 
actors in the network rather than to remain vertical, i.e. towards the forum actors have 
initially been delegated by. Actors might for example feel obliged to render accounts to 
their negotiation partners. Indeed, both logics of consequences as logics of 
appropriateness can encourage accountability practices. Because actors are embedded 
in different policy games and arenas they are induced to anticipate each other’s 
reactions (Papadopoulos 2007; Willems 2009). The actor-forum conceptualization 
makes a distinction between three natures of obligation in accountability relationships. 
In a vertical relation an actor feel compelled to give an account because of the formal 
hierarchical position of a forum. The nature of obligation is regarded as horizontal when 
the actor gives an account from a social commitment towards a forum. Lastly, an actor 
might also indirectly give an account to a forum. This relationship involves then a third 
party standing between the actor and the forum. The nature of the obligation is then 
regarded as diagonal (Bovens 2007). 
Finally, principal-agent thinking has been criticized for making abstraction of the 
institutional context and political culture accountability arrangements are embedded in. 
The potential influence of political parties on accountability relations is for example not 
incorporated in this approach. While empirical studies have demonstrated the party 
control in representative democracies on delegated representatives. Parties employ 
extensive screening procedures to guarantee party cohesion. As a consequence it is 
argued that representative democracies deemphasizes ex post control, i.e. accountability 
mechanisms. Moreover party cohesion requires discipline thus parties try to pressure 
member politicians to follow the party line (Strøm 2000; Strøm 2003). Hence when we 
are confronted with a lack of vertical accountability we can wonder if it’s the result of 
the characteristic of a governance networks or the result of a systemic problem 
regarding representative democracy. For instance Belgium is regarded as a true 
particracy. Political parties and party barons play a significant role both regarding the 
selection of personnel as towards the development of collaborative decision making 
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processes (Bovens 2007). Hence we might have to integrate political parties as 
particular forums in the actor-forum model as well as to incorporate it in our 
understanding of representation. 
Accountability and democratic anchorage 
According to Papadopoulos (2007) governance networks are democratically anchored 
as long as they are performed in the “shadow of democratic control”. The knowledge 
that their actions might be under public scrutiny might have a disciplining effect on 
actors. The role of local elected politicians herein might be rather that of a “coastal 
patrol” than that of an “anchor”, to borrow an alternative maritime metaphor from 
Hendriks (2008), since the shadow of democratic control does not require hands-on 
participation. Democratic control can also mean that politicians monitor  the 
development of network decision making from a distance and only intervene when the 
waters get rough.  
Yet there is a more profound normative argument to be made regarding the importance 
of accountability with regards to democratic anchorage. While governance networks 
might increase access to decision making they might also raise chances for unequal 
representation (Urbinati and Warren 2008). If we want to guarantee the liberal 
democratic ideal of political equality it seems impossible not to imagine a link to a 
democratic forum that has been elected through universal suffrage in a defined political 
space. Hence some institutional solution needs to be made to ensure the democratic 
legitimacy of governance practices (Hendriks 2009). Hereby political accountability can 
play its role as mechanism of control that balances the plurality of representative claims 
(Prezeworski, Stokes et al. 1999; Willems 2009). The compounded form of 
accountability can be a clever instrument with regards to the democratic anchorage of 
governance networks since compounded accountability is about controlling “the extent 
to which individual network members are accountable for exercising their 
accountability obligations” (Mulgan 2003).  
To conclude: operationalizing representation and accountability in 
governance networks 
 
At this point the question imposes itself what we can learn from this reflection regarding 
the operationalization of both representation and accountability in local governance 
networks. I argued in this paper that while both mechanisms in theory are obviously 
related they should be treated as separate. Since representative claims can be made 
without giving an account and accountability can be given without actively representing 
someone.  
Regarding the operationalization of both representation and accountability mechanisms 
I argued they should adjust to the characteristics of governance networks. Many 
scholars, both in the political science literature as from public administration, have been 
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criticizing the dominance of principal-agent thinking in our conceptualization of 
representation and accountability relations. Yet it seems the remnants of this approach 
are still present in our conceptualizations of these relations.  
To leave the principal-agent path regarding representation is to acknowledge that 
representatives not simply mirror but create multiple representative claims or 
portrayals of representatives. Thus representation is a dialectical process. When a 
representative claim is made with regards to a specific constituency, members of this 
constituency can reject, acknowledge or contest this claim. Yet also other actors can 
debate the validity of the claims made by an actor. Hence representative claims can be 
scrutinized through many incoherent accountability relations.  
I argue political accountability is the minimum condition to ensure the democratic 
anchorage of governance networks. However democratic “coastal patrol” is maybe a 
more appropriate term since anchorage through accountability requires governance 
networks to be accountable to a political forum but not an active representative of the 
interests of that forum within a governance arena. While representation is forward-
looking and idealizing, accountability is retrospective and scrutinizing. Yet also 
accountability is dialectical in nature since the rendering of accounts can reflect 
accountability narratives over time as well as shape it. 
In this paper I mentioned several analytical units that can be used for the 
operationalization of decision making, representation and accountability.  
According to the rounds model decision making processes in networks consists of 
actors, arenas, rounds and games. These elements and their relationships are embedded 
within an institutional milieu, political culture and structural context. The actor-forum 
approach to accountability seems to be flexible enough to withstand the critiques as 
formulated on the principal-agent model. In contrast to representation accountability is 
a very comprehensive concept since it consists of clear relationships between given 
actors and specified forums. Each relation holds the obligation to explain and justify 
conduct. I think it could be fruitful to develop the concept of representation in a similar 
way as relationships between representatives and constituencies. While representatives 
can be delegated by a constituency not all representative claims in governance networks 
are authorized this way.  
With regards to the democratic anchorage of governance networks the question is not 
whether the whole society is represented or if all actors are accountable. To guarantee 
the democratic principle of political equality governance networks require minimally a 
shadow of democratic control provided by an active accountability link to a 
democratically elected representative forum. 
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